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Abstract 
 
This chapter introduces a distinctive approach for scientific metaphysics. Instead of 
drawing metaphysical conclusions by interpreting the most basic theories of science, this 
approach draws metaphysical conclusions by analyzing how multifaceted practices of 
science work. Broadening attention opens the door to drawing metaphysical 
conclusions from a wide range of sciences. This chapter analyzes conceptual practice in 
genetics to argue that the reality investigated by biologists lacks an overall structure. It 
expands this conclusion to motivate the no general structure thesis, which states that the 
world lacks a general, overall structure that spans scales. It concludes that the no general 
structure thesis counts as metaphysics because it says something very important and 
general about the world. This thesis informs science as well as philosophy of science, 
and it provides a useful perspective for societies that look upon science to help solve 
complex problems in our changing world. 	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Introduction 
Scientific metaphysics can be described as an attempt to theorize about the 
fundamental nature of the world by drawing upon the best scientific theories of our 
day.1 The fact that the best scientific theories of the past turned out to be wrong about 
the fundamental nature of the world poses a challenge. Why, skeptics ask, should we 
expect today’s theories to provide a secure basis to inform us about the world’s 
fundamentals? In this chapter, I propose that instead of drawing metaphysical 
conclusions by interpreting the most basic theories of science, we draw conclusions by 
analyzing how multifaceted practices of science work. This opens metaphysical inquiry 
to areas of science that are not organized around efforts to articulate, develop, or extend 
the explanatory scope of a core theory.2 I motivate and illustrate this approach for 
scientific metaphysics by analyzing what is one of the most successful scientific 
practices of today: the practice of using genetics to investigate, manipulate, and explain 
the workings of organisms. 
This chapter begins by briefly discussing a traditional conception of scientific 
metaphysics. Next, it considers philosophical work aimed at identifying the fundamental 
nature of being in the biological world, such as being an organism, being a gene, or 
being a process of natural selection or genetic drift. Such work is not generally 
recognized by metaphysicians as an integral part of scientific metaphysics.3 Perhaps this 
work does not seem sufficiently general because it is cast at the wrong scale. But I will 
argue that if we reconceive generality in terms of what one finds across different scales, 
then questions about what is true at intermediate scales (such as the scales of 
macromolecules, cells, organisms, and ecosystems) are not necessarily less general than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Niall Roe (manuscript) distinguishes between scientific metaphysics and the metaphysics of science. 
Scientific metaphysics, the topic of this chapter, can be thought of as metaphysically inquiry that is informed 
by science. One might pursue this approach and yet leave open the possibility that this is not the exclusive 
legitimate approach for metaphysics. The metaphysics of science can be thought of as inquiry into 
metaphysical assumptions, concepts, and principles embedded within science. This inquiry might be 
pursued using exclusively traditional metaphysical approaches. For example, many metaphysicians assume 
that scientific reasoning critically relies on reasoning about dispositions. Much research on the 
metaphysics of dispositions, however, completely ignores contemporary science. Such research could be 
thought of as falling under the “metaphysics of science” even though it is not scientifically informed. 
Inquiry into metaphysical concepts embedded within science might also (or alternatively) be pursued by 
appealing to the findings or methodologies of contemporary science. See Stanford, this volume, for a 
somewhat different way of distinguishing between the metaphysics of science and scientific metaphysics. 
I prefer Roe’s classification because it acknowledges that some metaphysicians are trying to investigate the 
metaphysical assumptions, concepts, and principles embedded within science from an analytic 
perspective.  
2 This approach also opens the door to drawing metaphysical conclusions from areas of science whose 
practices are organized around core theories that cannot be interpreted as describing metaphysical 
fundamentals. 
3  Many, or least some, philosophers of biology conducting this work do believe it is an integral part of 
metaphysics. My point is that outside philosophy of biology this work is not generally recognized as being 
integral to metaphysics.  
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questions about what is true at the largest or smallest scales. I call this the generality across 
scales thesis.4 This sets the stage for developing the central argument of this chapter. 
My central argument starts by applying the traditional approach of scientific 
metaphysics to the science of genetics. But instead of applying this approach to today’s 
genetics, I first apply it to the genetics of the 1930s. I draw upon the best scientific 
theories of the era to theorize about the fundamentals of heredity, development, and 
evolution. In doing so, I consider the gene concept of classical genetics. Although genes 
were central to classical genetics, genes were entities with unknown structure and 
unknown proximate effect. Neither the what nor the how of their individual 
contributions were understood. Nevertheless, geneticists could accurately identify causal 
connections between genotypes and phenotypes in terms of the difference principle. This 
principle held in experimental contexts because geneticists deliberately simplified causal 
situations by standardizing environmental conditions and removing genetic differences 
that might affect the phenotypes under study. This manipulation and control is what 
made the practice of classical genetics possible, and I argue that it has important 
implications about how we should pursue scientific metaphysics.  
The next step in my central argument is to show that although one could have been 
(and still can be) a realist about the basic theory of classical genetics, attempts to 
interpret this theory for the purpose of drawing conclusions about the fundamentals of 
heredity, development, and evolution were doomed to fail. Furthermore, understanding 
how the basic theory was deployed in the context of experimental practice reveals the 
futility of trying to draw conclusions about fundamentals from this best theory. But 
what about the best theory of today’s genetics? Might the best theories of contemporary 
biology offer a more secure basis for identifying the fundamentals of heredity and 
development?  
I examine a central concept of contemporary genetics (the molecular gene concept) 
and explain how it is employed in practice. Although analyzing this concept in isolation 
of broader practice might lead one to conclude that it identifies the fundamental unit of 
heredity and development, examining how the concept is employed in practice reveals 
that it is not a category of being that “cuts nature at its joints”. The problem with using 
this metaphor is that DNA has too many joints. I will argue that the practice of genetics 
utilizes a flexible gene concept because there is no overall structure, functional or causal, 
of the elements of DNA.  
I expand my conclusion about genetics to motivate the no general structure thesis: the 
world lacks a general, overall structure that spans scales. It does not have a “the causal 
structure” that Salmon (1984) claims all explanations should fit into, and it lacks the 
kind of overall “definite and mind independent structure” that Psillos (1999) claims is 
an essential tenet of realism. This thesis is similar to the metaphysical views advanced by 
Cartwright (1983 and 1999) and Dupré (1995), though I motivate it differently. I close 
the chapter by arguing that the no general structure thesis counts as significant metaphysics.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The generality across scales thesis can be viewed as a challenge to Ladyman’s idea that physics is “the 
science that holds at the widest range scales” (Ladyman, this volume). 
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1. The traditional approach of scientific metaphysics. 
Scientific metaphysics refers to the idea that metaphysics should be informed by 
science (Kincaid 2014). This characterization raises two difficult questions: (1) what is 
metaphysics? and (2) how should metaphysics be scientifically informed? One indication 
of the difficulty of answering the first question is the emergence of a subfield, meta-
metaphysics, which is aimed at addressing questions about the nature of metaphysics as 
a subject area, including the question, “what is metaphysics?” (Chalmers et al 2009, 
Tahko 2016). For the purposes of this chapter, I will assume that metaphysics is an area 
of philosophy that seeks answers to questions about the general nature of reality, the 
general nature of the things, kinds, processes, and complexities in the world. One of the 
questions raised by this chapter concerns how we should conceptualize the sense of 
‘general’ when we say that metaphysics seeks to answer questions about the general 
nature of reality.   
The question of how metaphysics should be scientifically informed is also 
important, and this issue will be addressed in the present chapter. The literature on 
scientific metaphysics provides a somewhat ambiguous answer to this question. Some 
writings stress applying the results of science to answer metaphysical questions; other 
writings stress employing the methods of science. Philosophers emphasizing the results of 
science have focused on the most basic theoretical results of physics (e.g. Ladyman et al 
2007; Maudlin 2007, Callender 2011, and French 2014). This approach can be motivated 
by the idea that metaphysics is about the most fundamental features of the world, which 
is also what the theories of fundamental physics are about. The rough idea is that 
metaphysical conclusions should be drawn by interpreting the most basic theories of 
physics in order to determine what these theories say about the fundamentals of reality.  
Theoretical results of biological sciences have not played the kind of key role that 
theoretical results of physics have played in work explicitly recognized as scientific 
metaphysics. (I explain the qualification ‘work explicitly recognized as’ in section 2). 
Scientific metaphysicians who attend to the “special sciences” often assume that physics 
holds the trump cards for metaphysical questions and do not see a need to closely 
engage the actual theoretical contents of biological sciences to establish their basic 
metaphysical claims. For example, Ladyman et al (2007) and Ladyman (this volume) 
argue that the core project of metaphysics is to unify the theoretical findings of special 
sciences with the fundamental theories of physics. Their casual engagement with the 
contents of biological theories is markedly different than their close and serious 
engagement with theories of physics, and biology plays a different kind of role than 
physics in their argument. It’s as if physics comes first, and biology had better agree. 
French (2014) gives more serious attention to the actual contents of biology, but the 
core thesis (ontological structural realism) is established on the basis of analyzing 
physics (beginning in chapter 1). Biology is not addressed until the last chapter of the 
monograph (chapter 12). 
Writings about scientific metaphysics that emphasize the methods of science (rather 
than the results of science) often focus attention at the meta-level. For example, Maddy 
(2007) addresses questions about what methods metaphysics should employ, rather than 
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directly employing those methods in metaphysical inquiry. 5  In contrast, the new 
experimental school of philosophy seeks to use scientific methods, usually from social 
psychology or cognitive science, to generate results that will directly bear on problems 
that are widely considered to be part of contemporary metaphysics. Philosophers have, 
for example, employed experimental methods to address the problems of personal 
identity (e.g. Bruno and Nichols 2010), time (e.g. Paul 2010), causation (e.g. Hitchcock 
2012), and ontology (e.g. Smith 1999). The distinction between scientific metaphysics 
that emphasizes applying the results of science and scientific metaphysics that 
emphasizes applying the methods of science is not a sharp one. Some scientific 
metaphysicians attempt to both engage the results of science and apply the methods of 
science. While I acknowledge the scientific methods approach, for the remainder of this 
chapter, I use the term traditional scientific metaphysics to refer to the variety of metaphysics 
that attempts to inform metaphysical inquiry by interpreting theoretical results of 
empirical investigations that have already been conducted by scientists. 
Scientific metaphysics, as described above, typically involves interpreting the basic 
theories of physics to determine what these theories say about the fundamental reality 
of the world. But, as several authors have warned, this can be problematic since the 
basic theories of physics analyzed by metaphysicians are themselves grounded in 
metaphysical presuppositions (Sklar 1981, Hawley 2006, Chakravartty 2014). This raises 
the possibility that what is indirectly read off the fundamental theories of physics are the 
metaphysical biases of physicists, not empirically grounded metaphysical truths. Psillos 
(1999) responds that the key to avoiding this problem is to consider only those parts of 
scientific theories that are critical to the predictive success of the science. But I prefer 
another response. We should not conceive of scientific metaphysics as a purely 
empirical inquiry or as an inquiry that is informed by a purely empirical source. It is 
inquiry that, like science, involves an interplay or entanglement of non-empirical and 
empirical reasoning. The basic strategy underlying scientific metaphysics, I suggest, is 
based on the idea that the world provides constraints on scientific inquiry, and that 
philosophers can inform metaphysics by investigating these constraints.  
2. Questions about biological fundamentals.  
Scientific metaphysics has directed attention primarily to questions about the 
“fundamental” features of the world, those features that are common to everything, 
always, everywhere. Work explicitly recognized as scientific metaphysics centers on 
fundamental physics because scientific metaphysicians assume that whatever is true of 
fundamental physics must be true of everything (and whatever is true of biology is not 
true of everything). However, there is considerable work in philosophy of biology that 
can be interpreted as a metaphysical quest to identify fundamentals. The fundamentals 
sought in these inquiries are the fundamentals of the living world (rather than of the 
universe at large). This work can be interpreted as scientific metaphysics even though it 
is not always recognized as such. Consider, for example, the questions: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The distinction breaks down if one conceives of scientific inquiry as an integral part of metaphysics 
because under this conception the methods of science are (of course) being directly employed by 
scientific participants in the project of metaphysics.  
Forthcoming in Metaphysics in Philosophy of Science, edited by Matthew  Preprint 
Slater and Zanja Yudell editors, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
“No General Structure” 
 
	   5 
What is life? 
What is an organism (or a biological individual, or a Darwinian individual)? 
What is a species? 
What is natural selection? What is drift? 
What is fitness? 
What is group selection? 
What is a population? 
What is a gene? 
What is genetic/genomic/biological information? 
What is a signal? 
What is a mechanism?  
What is a function? 
Philosophers of biology have often analyzed and critiqued scientists’ answers to 
these questions with an eye towards identifying the fundamental reality of life, or the 
fundamental reality of being an organism, being a gene, or being a process of natural 
selection or drift. My claim is that many philosophers of biology (but not all) pursue 
these questions as if they are seeking fundamental answers to questions about 
ontological categories of being. One indication of this motivation is the frequent 
appearance of the term ‘fundamental’ in their writings. 
But, as mentioned in the introduction, this philosophical work in biology and 
philosophy of biology is not generally recognized as an integral part of scientific 
metaphysics (French 2014 is an exception). There are, perhaps, two reasons for this. 
One is that answers to these questions do not seem sufficiently general. For one thing, 
not everything in the universe is living or even a part of something alive. So there is a 
scope issue. In addition, biology is cast at a particular scale, so there is a scale issue. But 
if one reconceives generality in terms of what one finds at different scales (some readers 
might say different “levels” 6), then features found at intermediate scales (e.g. scales of 
macromolecules, cells, organisms, and ecosystems) are not necessarily less general than 
features found at the largest or smallest scales. The theory of quantum mechanics might 
describe general, structural features at very small scales, but it does not itself describe 
structural features that exist at larger, intermediate scales. For example, it does not 
describe structural features of the complexities in ecological dynamics or gene regulation 
that are being investigated by biologists. Perhaps the kinds of complexities that 
biologists deal with are quite general (even in non-living parts of the world) and 
representative of complexities throughout much of nature and across different scales. If 
so, then knowledge about the form of complexities in biology would have a kind of generality that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 I put term ‘level’ in quotation marks throughout this chapter because this terminology implies that 
nature is organized into levels. I do not assume that nature has an overall structure that is organized into 
levels, so I use the term ‘scale’. 
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basic theories of fundamental physics do not. I call this admittedly contentious idea the generality 
across scales thesis and return to it in sections 7 and 8.  
Perhaps another reason that metaphysicians do not generally recognize the 
questions presented above as metaphysical questions is that these questions do not yield 
neat, univocal answers. What is a species? According to many leading philosophers of 
biology, species are not any one kind of category or thing. As Ereshefsky (1998) puts it, 
the “various ‘taxa’ called species lack a common unifying feature.” And things do not 
parse more neatly at the level of genetics. Philip Kitcher is even more skeptical about 
genes than Marc Ereshefsky is about species: “a gene is whatever a competent biologist 
chooses to call a gene” (Kitcher 1992, p. 131).7 Nevertheless, these questions are often 
posed by philosophers of biology in fundamental terms, as if what it is to be a species or 
a gene should come down to a few principled essentials. When it turns out that the 
diversity of life cannot be neatly partitioned into species or organisms, or when it turns 
out DNA cannot be neatly partitioned into genes, philosophers become skeptical about 
the reality of such kinds and search for other kinds that will hold up to their 
philosophical (i.e. fundamentalist) ideals. Hence the shift in philosophical attention from 
species to populations, from organisms to Darwinian individuals, and from genes to 
discrete functional units in DNA. It is as if philosophers of biology are framing 
questions in ways that call out for metaphysical answers; that is, answers that would 
provide a basis for drawing  conclusions about the fundamentals of evolution, 
development, and life in general. 
It could be argued, by appealing to the reconceptualization of generality suggested 
above, that much research in philosophy of biology can be understood as scientific 
metaphysics. Under this interpretation, a central aim of philosophy of biology is to 
formulate basic questions in ways that answering them will identify the fundamentals of 
the biological world, for example the fundamentals of what it is to be a unit or process 
of heredity, development, or evolution. 
3. What is a gene? The classical gene concept in scientific practice. 
 
What is a gene? Contemporary geneticists employ multiple gene concepts that seem 
to offer conflicting answers. At one extreme is what I call the classical gene concept, 
which provides biologists with a blunt conceptual tool that works well in investigative 
and explanatory contexts in which precision is not available or useful (Waters 1994 and 
2007). At the other extreme is what I call the molecular gene concept, which provides 
biologists with a remarkably precise and yet flexible tool for contexts in which precision 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Beatty (1995) convincingly argues that there is a reason why there are no fundamental laws of biology: 
biological generalizations are contingent on the historical process of evolution. Beatty’s argument could 
be expanded to challenge the idea that their are fundamental biological entities, fundamental biological 
kinds, or fundamental biological processes as well. Whatever the explanation, unlike the basic theories in 
the parts of physics investigated by scientific metaphysicians, the basic theories across the biological 
sciences do not readily yield to the kind of fundamentalist interpretation associated with metaphysics. Of 
course, whether current or future theories will eventually yield to such an analysis is a contentious issue in 
philosophy of biology (e.g. Waters 2011, Okasha 2011).  
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is important (Waters 2000).  The classical gene concept, as the name suggests, comes 
from classical genetics, the practice of genetics developed by T. H. Morgan and his 
collaborators in the late 1910s and 1920s. This practice continued until it was retooled 
to become contemporary genetics (Waters 2008a). In this section, I describe conceptual 
practice in classical genetics. In the next section, I consider how a traditional scientific 
metaphysician, if working in the 1930s, might have answered the question “what is a 
gene?”  
 
It is important to understand that the classical concept of the gene was grounded in 
experimental practice, not in abstract theorizing. Experimental practice in classical 
genetics involved strategically constructing breeding regimens that produced distinctive 
inheritance patterns. These patterns were explained by a central theory, called the 
transmission theory. This theory was constructed to apply to artificial experimental 
situations and the experimental situations were constructed to instantiate the theory 
(Waters 2008b). This may appear to involve a problematic circularity or explanatory 
triviality. But these practices were aimed, not just at explaining transmission patterns, 
but at investigating a wide variety of biological processes, including hereditary, 
physiological, developmental, and evolutionary processes (Kohler 1994). When 
successful, this experimentation enabled biologists to manipulate processes they didn’t 
understand and to thereby reveal new information about these processes (Waters 2004).  
 
While it is important to understand geneticists’ theoretical explanations in the 
broader context of their experimental practice, one cannot understand this practice 
without analyzing how the theoretical/explanatory reasoning worked within it. 
Geneticists’ reasoning about genes invoked a conceptual division between the internal 
genetic makeup of an organism, called its genotype, and its outward character, called its 
phenotype. They explained patterns of phenotypic transmission produced in their 
experiments by following the transmission of genotypic differences from one generation 
to the next, and then attributing the presence of alternative phenotypic traits to the 
presence of alternative genotypes (i.e. to the presence of alternative forms of genes). 
These explanations were based on the transmission theory, which included the idea that 
genes are located in linear fashion on chromosomes, principles about the transmission 
of genes that were grounded in an understanding of chromosomal mechanics, and the 
principle that differences in genes cause differences in phenotypes. 
Let us consider the concept of the gene standing behind these explanations. As 
units passed down from generation to generation, genes were conceived as stable 
entities, capable of being replicated, located at designated positions in chromosomes. By 
at least the 1920s, most geneticists thought of genes as having physical structure, and it 
was the physical make-up of genes that was presumed to provide their stability. 
Practically nothing, however, was known about the internal structure of the gene until 
quite late in the development of classical genetics. The idea that there is a linear ordering 
of genes in chromosomes was essential to complex explanations of gene transmission, 
but this ordering does not imply anything about the structure of the genes themselves. 
Morgan and others frequently stated that their theory made two assumptions about the 
internal structure of genes:  (1) gene structure is relatively stable, and (2) the structure of 
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each gene is replicated before chromosomal division (e.g. Morgan 1926, p. 27). Muller 
(1922) pointed out that classical explanations positing spontaneous mutation made an 
additional assumption:  (3) mutations in the structure of a gene are also replicated.  
Just as Darwin's Origin of Species contained a scarcity of information about the nature 
of species and their origins, Morgan's Theory of the Gene had little to say about the 
structure of genes or their individual contributions to phenotypes. Genes could be 
speculatively related to the developing form of an organism, but the connection 
between genotype and phenotype was spelled out concretely only in terms of what I 
have called the difference principle: gene differences cause phenotypic differences within the 
genetic and environmental contexts of particular populations (Waters 1994 and 2007). 
Strevens (this volume) describes a similarly simple model of predator/prey population 
cycles in ecology that also involves difference making. But, he analyzes the ecological 
model in terms of an abstract explanatory principle (“enion probability analysis”) that is 
ultimately grounded in a metaphysical theory, whereas I analyze models of transmission 
in terms of a concrete principle grounded in investigative practice. In the case of 
genetics, at least, it is important to keep in mind that the explanatory principle is easily 
and very accurately applied in experimental contexts because geneticists deliberately 
simplified experimental situations by standardizing environmental conditions and 
removing genetic differences that might interfere with the expression or transmission of 
genes being used in an experiment.8  
It is easy to exaggerate the knowledge (or claims) of classical geneticists by focusing 
on theoretical explanations in an abstract context (rather than in the context of 
experimental investigation) or by citing geneticists’ speculations. For example, classical 
geneticists have sometimes been accused by later scientists, philosophers and historians 
as believing in a simple one gene / one character conception, a version of 
preformationism. 9  This misinterpretation might arise because geneticists’ practice 
involved creating situations in which just one gene is the actual difference maker of a 
phenotypic difference in a laboratory population (Waters 2007). From a distance, it 
might appear that geneticists thought their explanations of experimental phenomena 
represented inheritance generally. But practicing geneticists understood that they were 
creating simple situations (which was obvious to them because they had to deliberately 
set up these situations to make their experiments work). 
The relation between genotype and phenotype is not "one gene / one character", 
and classical geneticists knew this. As they clearly stated, one gene can affect a variety of 
characters and a single character can be influenced by a number of different genes 
(genes at different loci). Geneticists knew, for example, that eye color in Drosophila is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 I worry that Strevens’ simple model cannot be applied to actual population cycles in an accurate way and 
that his analysis is too far removed from actual investigative practices in ecology to be useful. Stanford’s 
critique seems to apply (Stanford, this volume).  
9 Examples of such exaggeration are too numerous to cite, but I take Moss (2000) and Keller (2003) 
accounts of classical genetics as representative of how historians and philosophers exaggerate the claims 
of classical genetics (claims of which they are very critical). Keller (personal communication) makes the 
compelling argument that geneticists’ speculations reveal biases that had significant impact on their 
research. 
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affected by mutations at many different loci; by 1915, Morgan's group had already 
identified mutations at 25 separate loci that affected eye color (Morgan, Sturtevant, 
Muller, and Bridges 1915, p. 208). They knew that these mutations generally affect 
several different characteristics. The white eye allele (located on the X chromosome), 
for example, was associated not just with white eyes, but with a colorless sheath of the 
testes, sluggish behavior, and perhaps a shortened life span as well. Experimental 
practice included protocols for selecting just one such phenotypic difference for 
experimental purposes. A one gene /one character conception of the gene makes sense 
only from a decontextualized, abstract perspective.  
An examination of Morgan’s sophisticated reflections on genotype/phenotype 
relations reinforces this interpretation. In Theory of the Gene (1926), Morgan reported that 
embryology reveals that every organ of the body is the "culmination of a long series of 
processes" and he presumed that genes act on the steps along the way. If each step in 
the development of an organ is affected by many genes, he reasoned, then there 
couldn't be any single gene for the organ. Likewise, if one gene affects steps in the 
development of multiple organs, then there couldn't be any single organ associated with 
a gene. Hence, the many-many relations. Morgan elaborated: 
Suppose, for instance, to take perhaps an extreme case, all the genes are 
instrumental in producing each organ of the body. This may only mean that they 
all produce chemical substances essential for the normal course of development. 
If now one gene is changed so that it produces some substance different from 
that which it produced before, the end-result may be affected, and if the change 
affects one organ predominantly it may appear that one gene alone has produced 
this effect. In a strictly causal sense this is true, but the effect is produced only in 
conjunction with all the other genes. (Morgan 1926, p. 306) 
Classical geneticists could only speculate about the immediate impact of genes (here, 
Morgan speculated that they produce chemical substances). This passage and Morgan's 
discussion of developmental processes suggest that the immediate impact of a gene is 
separated from characteristics such as eye color by a series of developmental processes 
that are also influenced by a number of other genes. This means that it would be 
impossible to specify a gene's contribution to phenotype in terms of characteristics such 
as eye color.  
An abstract analysis of the transmission theory might make it appear that classical 
geneticists had a lot to say about genes, heredity, and development. But an examination 
of their theoretical knowledge in the broader context of experimental practice reveals 
that they did not have a lot to say about these matters. The real value of their science 
involved what they could manipulate and investigate, not what they could explain (and 
not even what their theory could in principle explain, see Waters (2004). 
My aim in this section is to make two points. First, the structure of the world that 
geneticists were manipulating and investigating was not directly reflected in the structure 
of their concepts and theories. Second, one gets a better sense of the complexity of the 
reality that geneticists were engaging when one analyzes their investigative and 
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manipulative practices in light of their concrete, local aims (instead of analyzing their 
theoretical explanations abstractly – as if all we need to consider is their aim to explain 
inheritance patterns or their alleged aim to explain all development in terms of genes). 
Scientific metaphysicians interested in complex reality should focus on scientific 
knowledge (including theoretical knowledge) in the context of scientific practices 
(broadly speaking), not in an abstract context in which theories can be viewed separately 
from material practices designed to advance investigative and manipulative goals . 
4. Applying the traditional approach of scientific metaphysics to the 
best biological theories of 1930s. 
 Morgan was a meticulous empiricist and he tried to avoid letting speculation 
enter into his scientific writings. But scientific metaphysics is by its nature speculative, 
and it is fair to ask how hypothetical scientific metaphysicians in the 1930s might have 
answered the question, “What is a gene?” Could their answer to this question provide a 
basis for answering questions about the fundamentals of heredity, development and 
evolution?  
Bold scientific metaphysicians of the 1930s (and it is fair to assume that these 
hypothetical metaphysicians would have been as bold as today’s real ones) might have 
claimed that since presumably every stable inheritance pattern can be attributed to gene 
differences, that genes must be the fundamental constituents of heredity. In fact, many 
biologists, until quite recently have written in textbook expositions and glossaries that 
genes are the “fundamental units of inheritance”. What does it mean to say the gene is 
the fundamental unit of heredity? Presumably it means that if you could identify every 
gene and every difference in every gene, and if you could trace the transmission of each 
gene and each gene difference from one generation to the next, then you would have a 
comprehensive basis for understanding everything about heredity.  
Scientific metaphysicians of the 1930s could have gone further. Since differences in 
genes cause phenotypic differences by affecting the way organisms develop, genes might 
also be the fundamental units of development. What would this mean? It would mean that if 
you could identify every gene and the functional role of every gene, then you would 
have a comprehensive basis for understanding everything in development. A scientific 
metaphysician of the 1930s would not need to speculate about the role of genes, but 
they could draw on the success of the transmission theory to claim that genes must have 
functional roles of some kind, and that fulfilling these roles must provide the 
fundamental basis underlying the development of organisms.  
Although this might appear excessively speculative, consider the point that many 
contemporary metaphysicians take to be a marker of metaphysical significance: 
unification (e.g. Ladyman et al 2007, Ladyman this volume). Identifying the gene as the 
fundamental unit of both heredity and development would unify their understanding of 
these phenomena. With the establishment of classical genetics, the science of heredity 
(genetics) and the science of development (embryology) had become disunified. But by 
going to the fundamentals, a metaphysician could have exclaimed, “this metaphysical 
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interpretation reveals an underlying unity of nature!” This would be viewed as a basis 
for confidence. But why stop with the processes of inheritance and development?  
  Scientific metaphysicians of the 1930s might have wondered whether genes could 
also be the fundamental units of evolutionary change. Evolution involves the inheritance of 
changes in the forms of organisms over many, many generations. This must involve the 
inheritance of changes in the way organisms develop these forms. So, the metaphysical 
interpretation might go, genes must be the fundamental units of evolutionary change. 
Again, we could ask, what would this mean? Presumably, it would mean that if you 
could identify every gene and every difference in every gene that has occurred in 
evolutionary history, if you could identify the first appearance of each of these genes 
and gene differences, and if you could trace and explain the changes in frequencies of 
these genes and gene differences, then you would have a comprehensive basis for 
understanding evolution.  
Scientific metaphysician in the 1930s could have appealed to the latest 
developments in evolutionary theorizing and drawn upon the abstract theoretical work 
of Fisher, Haldane, and Wright to substantiate this view. The unification of fundamental 
principles of evolution with the fundamental unit of heredity and development could 
have made this interpretation of the best scientific theories of their day extremely 
appealing.  
Of course, I am not advocating the idea that genes really are the fundamental units of 
heredity, development, or evolution, or even the more modest idea that scientists and 
philosophers of the 1930s had good reason for believing this. After all, section 3 shows 
that analyzing the classical concept of the gene in the context of scientific practice 
(rather than abstractly) reveals that there was good reason not to view classical genes as 
fundamental units of inheritance. The aim of this section is to show that today’s favored 
approach to scientific metaphysics is unreliable. We can see this because if philosophers 
of the 1930s used this approach to identify the fundamentals of life, and if they analyzed 
the transmission theory and explanations in an abstract fashion (i.e. not in terms of the 
role they played in the context of investigative practice), they could have erroneously 
concluded that genes are the fundamental units of heredity, development, and 
evolution.  
5. What is a gene? The molecular gene concept in scientific practice. 
How should contemporary scientific metaphysicians answer the question: “what is a 
gene?” Most philosophers weighing in on this question have concluded that trying to 
answer it is hopeless. For example, consider the prevalent idea that genes are units in 
DNA that “code for” polypeptides. (Some background: DNA is a macromolecule 
consisting of two complementary linear sequences of nucleotides; RNA is a 
macromolecule consisting of one linear sequences of nucleotides; a polypeptide is a 
molecule made up of a linear sequence of amino acids.) According to this prevalent 
idea, genes are subsequences of nucleotides in a strand of DNA. The basic story behind 
this conception goes as follows. A linear sequence of nucleotides in DNA comprises a 
gene, and this sequence is “transcribed” into a corresponding sequence of nucleotides 
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making up an individual RNA molecule during RNA synthesis. Subsequently, the linear 
sequence of nucleotides in this RNA molecule is “translated” into a linear sequence of 
amino acids making up a polypeptide molecule during polypeptide synthesis. But it 
turns out that the syntheses of RNA and polypeptide molecules are far more 
complicated than this story suggests. These complications render this simplistic 
conception of genes ambiguous, vague, and exception-ridden. 
On this basis, Evelyn Fox Keller (2003) argues that the term ‘gene’ has outlived its 
usefulness, and many philosophers of biology agree with Keller. Much of the 
philosophical literature on this topic implies that the fundamental units of genetics exist 
at smaller scales and are more varied than suggested above. Some philosophers have 
argued that the real “molecular-level” units of genetics are not genes, but what were 
once thought to be parts of genes: promoters, enhancers, exons, and introns. Some 
philosophers have also argued that genes exist, but only at the “higher level” of classical 
genetics. Other philosophers have proposed novel gene concepts that seem to depart 
significantly from conceptual practice. For example, one idea is that genes are processes 
rather than entities (Griffiths and Neumann-Held 1999). But for the most part, 
philosophers have decided that today’s science tells us that there is no such thing as a 
gene at the “molecular level”. 
I have argued that an analysis of how contemporary geneticists reason when they 
use the term ‘gene’ reveals that they use a multiplicity of concepts (Waters 1994). 
Sometimes it is useful to be vague, and in such contexts biologists invoke a blunt 
concept akin to the gene concept of classical genetics (described in section 3). In other 
contexts it is important to be precise. When precision is important, biologists employ 
what I have called the molecular gene concept (Waters 1994, 2000).10  
The molecular gene concept has placeholders. When the placeholders are filled, the 
concept can be used to pick out precise segments of DNA. So this concept is precise. 
But it is also flexible because the placeholders of the concept can be filled out in a 
multiplicity of ways, and the different instantiations that result can be used to pick out 
different segments of nucleotides in DNA. Some instantiations pick continuous 
segments, others pick out discontinuous segments. Some instantiations pick out 
segments that overlap segments picked out by other instantiations. The overall situation 
is very messy. But the flexibility of this concept enables biologists to pick out different 
precise segments of DNA that are relevant to different explanatory, investigative, and 
manipulative interests.  
The molecular gene concept can be specified as follows: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Paul Teller comments that chemistry employs different concepts of atom in a similar way. Some 
concepts are useful in certain contexts because they are blunt. Other concepts are useful in other contexts 
because they are precise. Although what I say here is directly about genetics and allied sciences, I believe 
it applies to sciences more generally. 
Forthcoming in Metaphysics in Philosophy of Science, edited by Matthew  Preprint 
Slater and Zanja Yudell editors, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
“No General Structure” 
 
	   13 
a gene g  for linear sequence l  in product p  synthesized in cellular context c  
is a potentially replicating nucleotide sequence, n, usually contained in DNA, that 
determines the linear sequence l in product p at some stage of DNA expression. 
 
The referent of any gene, g, is a specific sequence of nucleotides. The exact 
sequence to which a g refers depends on how the placeholders l, p, and c are filled out.11 
As figure 1 illustrates, this provides biologists with the conceptual means to pick out 
precisely what DNA segments determine different linear sequences in different stages 
and contexts of DNA expression.  
 
 
FIG. 1: The molecular gene concept enables biologists to partition DNA in multiple 
ways. With respect to this figure, if biologists are interested in the synthesis of the 
primary RNA transcript (see above), then the DNA segment covered by the bracket 
directly under ‘gene for primary RNA segment’ is the relevant gene (the continuous 
region of five segments in the DNA molecule starting with the solid white segment and 
ending with the solid black segment). If biologists are interested in the synthesis of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The relevant sense of ‘determine’ is analyzed in Waters 2007. 
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polypeptide B occurring in some tissue at a particular stage of development, then the 
relevant gene is the discontinuous region marked by the brackets directly under ‘Gene 
for polypeptide B’ (the white and black segments in DNA and not the segments 
between).  
 
The molecular gene concept is a remarkable conceptual tool. It gives biologists the 
flexibility they need to pick out DNA segments that line up with different causal chains 
(or processes) within the incredible complexities of DNA expression and development. 
It does so by providing the basis for partitioning the DNA molecule in a multiplicity of 
different ways. 
In answer to the question, “what is a gene?”, a contemporary scientific 
metaphysician adopting the traditional approach might answer that a gene is any 
segment of nucleotides that satisfies the analysis presented in this section. After all 
(trusting this analysis), this is what the best scientific theorizing of today employs as its 
gene concept. 
6. Problems with applying the traditional approach of scientific 
metaphysics to genetics. 
One problem with applying the traditional approach of scientific metaphysics to 
genetics is that the results are unstable. It leads to results that might seem plausible at 
one time, but turn out to be implausible afterward. For example, the fundamental 
interpretation of classical genetics set out in section 4 turns out to be simply false. 
Subsequent developments in genetics, developmental biology, and evolutionary biology 
have shown that genes are not fundamental units of heredity, development, and evolution. 
Genes are not the fundamental units of heredity and development because it is plainly 
false that knowledge about the functioning of each and every gene would provide the 
fundamental basis for explaining everything about heredity or development (Griffiths 
and Stotz 2013). Genes are not the fundamental units of evolution. Even if one could 
identify each and every gene that has occurred in evolutionary history, each and every 
difference in each gene that has occurred in evolutionary history, the first appearance of 
each of these genes and gene differences, and even if you could trace and explain the 
changes in frequencies of these gene differences, you would still not have a 
comprehensive basis for understanding all of evolution. 
The attempt to interpret the best theories of the 1930s to identify the fundamentals 
of heredity, development, and evolution would have led to false conclusions (and the 
conclusions would not have been trivially false, they would have been false in significant 
ways).  I wish to emphasize that the problem is with trying to interpret the transmission 
theory in a way that will reveal the fundamentals. The problem is not with the 
transmission theory as it was used in practice. The theoretical explanations, as sketched 
in section 3 (see Waters 2007 for more details), have withstood the test of time. 
Subsequent findings at the molecular level indicate that these explanations were correct. 
The transmissions of differences in functional units arranged linearly in chromosomes 
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were indeed causally responsible for the patterns of phenotypic transmission produced 
in the laboratory. History does not undermine a realist interpretation of local 
explanations of classical genetics. But history does undermine an attempt to interpret 
the basic theory in a way that reveals the fundamental structure of the world (or the 
fundamental structure of inheritance, development, and evolution).  
But perhaps the theories of genetics in the 1930s were not sufficiently developed to 
provide a basis for drawing stable metaphysical conclusions. Traditional scientific 
metaphysicians might respond that we should look to today’s science, not yesterday’s. 
And doesn’t my analysis of the molecular gene concept support the idea that genes are 
fundamental units? After all, the analysis identifies a kind of internal structure and a 
kind of immediate functional role (in RNA synthesis) allegedly shared by all molecular 
genes. So this class of genes could be considered to be a natural (or fundamental) class. 
But this is a natural class (or kind) in a weak sense, in the sense of sharing an internal 
makeup and structure and having the same kind of proximate causal impact.  
In a stronger sense, natural classes (or kinds) are supposed to provide the single correct 
parsing that reveals the joints of nature. Such classes would be categories of being that key 
into the fundamental structure of the world. If we looked at the gene concept out of the 
context of investigative and manipulative practices, it might appear to designate a 
natural class in this strong sense. But when we see how the concept is employed in 
practice, and why it is a useful concept, we see it designates a natural class only in the weak 
sense. 
The molecular gene concept is useful not only because of its precision, but also 
because of its flexibility. The concept is relational. It is a gene for concept (Waters 2000). 
It can be applied differentially, to pick out different causal chains passing through 
DNA. These chains of causation extend from bewildering causal complexities of cellular 
functioning through different portions of DNA and then continue out into equally 
bewildering causal complexities of the cell. Multiple causal chains are entangled with 
one another and proceed through overlapping segments of DNA.12 The molecular 
concept enables biologists to identify and manipulate individual chains in precise ways 
while other chains are stable (often systems are held stable via experimental 
manipulation). This enables biologists to slip and slide through causal entanglements 
that they do not understand in their natural complexity. In multicellular eukaryotes, 
differential splicing leads to different proteins in different functional contexts in 
different tissues at different stages of development. In some contexts, one set of exons 
plays a key role determining linear sequences; in other contexts other segments play key 
roles in determining linear sequences. The molecular gene concept enables biologists to 
specify the exons relevant to the synthesis of different proteins in particular cellular 
contexts without knowing much about the overall complexity of the natural situation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Griffiths and Stotz 2013 supports this account of the causal situation, though it does not argue for the 
kind of metaphysical view advanced in this chapter. In fact, its argumentation seems to assume a much 
different epistemology and metaphysics than the one being developed in this chapter and the corpus of 
work this chapter draws upon (Waters 1994 through Waters 2014). 
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The fact that this kind of conceptual practice works so well in genetics supports the 
idea that molecular genes are not a natural class in the stronger sense. That is, they do 
not provide a single correct parsing of DNA that reveals fundamental joints of nature. 
If molecular genes were a natural class in this strong sense they would provide the 
unique division of DNA that would line up with the uniquely correct and 
comprehensive partition of development processes. Parsing DNA at its joints would 
line up with a parsing developmental at its joints. But geneticists have not identified 
such a canonical parsing. So, the metaphor of dividing nature at its joints does not seem 
to fit. There are simply way too many “joints” in DNA and way too many useful ways 
to parse the molecular and developmental processes. I have already explained that some 
parsings of DNA key into particular processes in particular tissues at particular 
developmental stages, other parsings key into different developmental processes in 
other tissues and/or other developmental stages. But the same is true from the other 
direction. Biologists have not found a parsing of genetic control processes that keys into 
a canonical set of joints in DNA. In sum, what they have found is that just as DNA 
complexly impinges on a causal mess, a causal mess also complexly impinges on DNA. 
That is why conceptual practice takes the form it does. Biologists have designed the 
molecular gene concept so they can navigate through a mess.  
My concern is not that individuating genes in DNA depends on employing a 
relational concept. Rather, my point is that the way this relational concept is employed 
in practice indicates that the overall situation is far too messy to apply the metaphor of 
cutting nature at its joints. The remarkable feat of biologists is that they have succeeded 
in developing conceptual and technical tools that enable them to maneuver within 
bewildering messy complexities without having an overall theory or understanding of 
these complexities. My metaphysical claim is that scientific practices in genetics and 
allied sciences take this form because they are adapted to a reality that has no overall 
structure. The reality has lots of structure, but no overall structure. 
7. Drawing general conclusions from conceptual practice in genetics.  
Scientific metaphysicians might respond to my skepticism about the idea that the 
intermediate-scale world that biologists engage lacks an overall structure by retreating 
from biology. “Perhaps biology is not ready for metaphysics. Perhaps geneticists haven’t 
found nature’s joints. But the joints must exist. If not in DNA, then elsewhere.” I 
disagree. Genetics is sufficiently advanced to draw important metaphysical conclusions. 
But to draw them we must broaden our attention from a narrow focus on its theories 
and theoretical concepts, to how its theories and concepts are used in the context of 
broader investigative and manipulative practices. In addition, we should not assume at 
the outset that the world must have an overall structure, or that living systems and 
processes must have an overall structure at the scale being manipulated and investigated 
by biologists. 
The practice of genetics enables biologists to control and manipulate a wide variety 
of phenomena and to gain new knowledge about the entities and processes of life. If the 
metaphysical ideas set out in section 4 were true, then the practice of contemporary 
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genetics would presumably take a different form than it does. It would be based on a 
gene concept that provided a canonical parsing of DNA. But contemporary gene 
concepts do not provide such a parsing (or imply that such a parsing exists even in 
principle). Instead, biologists rely on gene concepts that enable them to parse DNA in a 
multiplicity of ways. Why does their practice take this form? The simple answer is 
“because it works”.  Practice has been adapted to work in the reality of the world that 
biologists are engaging. 
A metaphor might be helpful here.13 Biologists using genetics to investigate the 
workings of organisms are like newcomers trying to navigate in a strange city. Suppose 
they enter the city of Arles in southern France. The streets of Arles lack a general, 
overall structure. You can learn to navigate in one small part of the city, but that does 
not help you anticipate the layout of another part of the city. Contrast this with 
newcomers arriving in the western Canadian city of Calgary. The streets of Calgary are 
laid out in a grid with four quadrants. “Streets” are oriented north/south (they run from 
north to south or from south to north) and “avenues” are oriented east/west. Streets 
are numbered sequentially in each quadrant, starting from the center of the city. For 
example, streets in the northwest quadrant are named 1 Street NE, 2 Street NE, and 3 
Street NE. Avenues are named in the same fashion, for example 1 Avenue NE 2, 
Avenue NE, and 3 Avenue NE.  
The best strategy for learning to navigate in cities like Calgary is to key into the 
overall structure. Exceptions to the grid structure exist near rivers and railroad tracks, 
but knowing there is some general, overall structure will facilitate newcomers’ 
exploration of the city. Newcomers investigating Washington D.C. would also be well-
served by a strategy that rests on the assumption that there is some overall structure of 
streets, even though the structure of streets in D.C. is quite different than the structure 
of streets in Calgary. But newcomers to Arles should strategize their investigation 
differently because there is no overall structure to the street layout in Arles. My claim is 
that the domains being investigated by biologists using genetics are more like Arles than 
Calgary. We can infer this from the nature of the practices used in genetics. The world 
within organisms, like the street layout of Arles, is a mess. The practice of genetics has 
been adapted to navigate through the mess; the molecular concept of the gene is 
designed to enable biologists to investigate and control causal pathways within a messy, 
dynamic entanglement of interacting causal chains, an entanglement that they do not 
understand in its complexity.14  
The idea that the reality within organisms lacks an overall structure can be 
generalized. It implies that the world in its entirety lacks a general overall structure. That 
is, it suggest that the world lacks a “the structure” that spans scales. But perhaps the 
domain (part and scale of the world) investigated by genetics is an exception. Perhaps 
the world is like the street layout of Calgary, and the living portion of the world at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 I thank John Norton for suggesting this metaphor. 
14 The distinction and metaphor presented here is somewhat similar to Feynman’s distinction between 
Greek and Babylonian approaches to theorizing (1967) as discussed by Wimsatt (2007). But Wimsatt’s 
rich and provocative discussion seems to assume that the world itself has a fundamental structure even 
though physical theories do not. 
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scale being investigated by geneticists is akin to the portion of Calgary located near the 
Elbow River, where the grid breaks down and the street layout is messy.  
In section 2, I described the generality across scales thesis, which states that features 
of the world at intermediate scales (such as the scales of macromolecules, cells, 
organisms, and ecosystems) are not necessarily less general than features at the smallest 
and largest scales. The generality across scales thesis implies that the feature of having 
no overall structure could obtain quite generally across scales being investigated by 
biological and social scientists, and by physical scientists in many fields as well. Why 
should we think that the universe has structure at every scale or that the principles (or 
laws) at the smallest scales provides an overall structure at larger scales?15  Is the 
structure of the world a fractal? 
There is much work to be done to clarify the widespread assumption that the world 
has a “the structure” and to articulate the contrary no general structure thesis. This work 
will require drawing upon traditional work in metaphysics as well as carefully analyzing a 
greater breadth of scientific practices across a range of sciences, biological, social, and 
physical. This chapter offers a start by arguing for the idea that the reality engaged by 
geneticists lacks an overall structure and by raising the question of whether the 
widespread metaphysical assumption that the world has a “the structure” is mistaken.  
8. Does the no general structure thesis count as significant 
metaphysics? 
Does the claim that the world lacks a general, overall structure that spans scales 
count as a significant metaphysical idea? I close this chapter by responding to four 
objections to the supposition that it does. But before proceeding with the first 
objection, it is worth pointing out that a denial of a metaphysical thesis is itself a 
metaphysical thesis. The assumption that the world has a “the structure” across scales, 
which is widely held by philosophers of science, is a metaphysical thesis. Hence, claims 
that deny this assumption are also metaphysical. So the claim that the reality within 
organisms lacks an overall structure at the scale at which geneticists engage, and more 
generalized versions of this claim, must also be metaphysical. 
Objection 1: The no general structure thesis is too skeptical to count as 
metaphysics. After all, it amounts to an antirealist view about science, so it must 
be anti-metaphysics.  
This chapter does not advance an antirealist view of science. Section 3 sketches 
classical geneticists’ explanations of phenotypic transmission patterns for two purposes. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The significance of the idea that the science of fundamental physics “holds” across scales, often 
expressed by philosophers of physics (e.g. Ladyman, this volume), is unclear. Does it imply that the laws 
or principles of fundamental physics structure the world across scales? This depends upon how we 
interpret ‘holds’. I believe there is a way to interpret the idea that a set of principles “holds across scales” 
that is consistent with the no generality across scales thesis. This is an idea worth exploring, but I do not 
have the space to do so here. 
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First, to show that the theoretical explanations of classical genetics have stood the test 
of time. We should be realists about the geneticists’ theoretical claims that gene 
differences caused phenotypic differences in the experimental contexts they constructed 
and that patterns of phenotypic transmission produced in experiments resulted from the 
transmission of gene differences from one generation to the next. Classical geneticists 
were right about the causal relationship between genotype and phenotype in their 
experiments, they were right about gene differences being located in linear fashion in 
chromosomes, and they were right about the roles that chromosomal mechanics in 
meiosis played in producing the patterns of gene transmission they produced in the 
laboratory.  
The second purpose for sketching the theoretical explanations in classical genetics is 
to separate this realist account of the transmission theory from a fundamentalist 
interpretation of this theory (the former is presented in section 3, the latter in section 4). 
I agree with Cartwright (1999, p. 23) that fundamentalism, not realism, is the problem. 
We should also be realists about the central theory of contemporary genetics, but 
again we should separate our realism from a fundamentalist interpretation of the theory. 
Scientific metaphysics should proceed from an analysis of the form practice in genetics 
takes, not from an analysis of its core theoretical concepts removed from the context of 
that practice. Simply put, metaphysics should be practice-centered, not theory-focused.16 
But practice-centered metaphysics does not ignore theory and it does not adopt an anti-
realist attitude towards those theories. Hence, this metaphysics is not based on 
antirealism. 
Objection 2: Can we really draw a conclusion about metaphysics from scientific 
practice? Doesn’t this analysis simply reveal epistemological or cognitive 
limitations? 
This objection expresses a worry that applies to all metaphysics. When 
metaphysicians employ methods of analytic philosophy to investigate how the world 
must be, might they just be investigating how we must conceive the world because of 
our cognitive limitations? When traditional, scientific metaphysicians interpret the 
theories and explanations of physics to investigate “the structure” of the world, might 
they just be reinforcing scientists’ biases or theories that are partly shaped by our limited 
cognitive abilities? Might the apparent mess of causal interactions within organisms 
being investigated using genetics have an overall structure that humans cannot 
recognize because of cognitive limitations? Yes, yes, and yes. 
Metaphysics is risky business. Scientific metaphysics is based on the idea that 
appealing to science to inform metaphysics will decrease the risks. Appealing to a 
broader analysis of science, one that examines the use of concepts and theories in the 
context of investigative, manipulative, and local explanatory practices will better inform 
metaphysics. I maintain that informing metaphysics by analyzing the concepts and 
theories of science from a narrow, theory-focused perspective is riskier than informing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For more on the distinction between practice-centered and theory-focused, see Waters 2014. 
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metaphysics by analyzing the investigative and manipulative practices in which these 
concepts and theories are employed.  
Objection 3: This conclusion is not sufficiently general to count as metaphysics.  
A preliminary response to this objection is given in section 2. But it is worth re-
stating with respect to the no general structure thesis. A critic advancing this objection 
might be willing to grant that the causal processes within an organism lack an overall 
structure at the scale at which geneticists engage. But the critic could still object: “So 
what if the world at this scale within organisms is a mess? This does not mean that the 
nonliving world at this scale is a mess (scope issue). And it does not even mean that the 
world within the organism is a mess (scale issue). To determine whether the world is a 
mess, one needs to consider everything in the whole world not just some entities within 
it (organisms). And to consider the world at this universal scope, one must consider it at 
the appropriate scale, a much smaller scale than the scale of causal interaction being 
investigated by geneticists. Fundamental physics is the only discipline that can reveal 
whether the world has an overall structure and what that structure might be.”  
In section 2, I respond to this kind of objection by suggesting that we should adopt 
a different sense of general. Instead of thinking of general in terms of applying to 
everything at some one scale, we should conceive of generality across different scales. 
Claims about an overall structure existing at very small scales are not necessarily 
informative about whether there are overall structures at larger scales. The generality across 
scales thesis suggests that the no overall structure idea applies quite generally across scales 
being investigated by biological and social scientists, and by physical scientists in many 
fields as well. Metaphysics can (and should) be thought of as concerning what is true 
across many scales, especially across scales we directly engage and experience as human 
beings. 
Objection 4:  This conclusion does not count as a significant metaphysical thesis 
because it is trivial.  
Stanford (this volume) critiques traditional scientific metaphysics and argues that it 
adds nothing of value to philosophy of science. I believe Stanford’s critique raises an 
important question: what is scientific metaphysics good for? Being informed by science, 
by itself, does not make a metaphysics important. Metaphysics should not only be 
informed by science; metaphysics should be informing science, the rest of philosophy, 
and society as well. I conclude this chapter by arguing that the no general structure 
thesis is a metaphysical doctrine of real importance. 
With respect to philosophy, the no general structure thesis can inform our 
epistemology of science. Consider philosophy of biology. This thesis implies that the 
questions set out in section 2 should not be interpreted as fundamental questions. The 
distinction drawn with respect to classical genetics should be drawn with respect to 
these questions as well. In the case of classical genetics, the science provided accurate 
descriptions and explanations, but it should not be interpreted to yield a fundamental 
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account of heredity, development, or evolution. Such interpretations rest on an 
assumption that the processes of heredity, development, and evolution have some 
fundamental structure such that it must be possible to find a basis of scientific 
understanding that keys into that structure. But the no general structure thesis implies 
that our interpretations of scientific knowledge should not be premised on the faith that 
such structures exist. This thesis has important implications for how philosophers of 
biology should interpret and answer questions such as, “what is a species?”, “what is an 
organism?”, or “what is a Darwinian population?” In addition, the no general structure 
thesis has implications for how we should interpret and answer meta-scientific questions 
such as, “what is a natural kind?” 
The no general structure thesis can inform science as well. The quest for a 
comprehensive and unified, or even integrated, explanatory perspective can be a useful 
heuristic, but it should be viewed a heuristic, not as the aim of science. Practicing 
geneticists were right not to follow philosophers when we obsessed about questions 
such as ‘what is fitness?’ or  ‘what is a gene?’ It might be heuristically useful to ask such 
questions, but when it is not useful, such questions can simply be dropped and the 
project of investigating and manipulating nature can resume. A philosophy of biology 
that asked, “what ways of conceiving of biological individuals could be useful?” and “in 
what contexts and for what purposes would they be useful?” would be much more 
informative to biologists than simply asking, “what is a biological individual?”. The no 
general structure thesis is important to science. A philosophy of science that adopted 
this thesis would be more useful to scientists. 
The no general structure thesis is far from trivial. It has important implications for 
how scientists should conduct their investigations and how we (philosophers of science) 
should conduct ours. But shouldn’t metaphysics do more? Shouldn’t it also inform 
society about how to conduct its affairs? The no general structure thesis can deliver on 
this desideratum as well. It suggests that society should admire science for its secure 
knowledge about the world, but that society should not interpret that knowledge as if it 
depended upon or provided an understanding of fundamentals. Research in genetics 
should be supported and funded, but not because it will “decode life” or reveal the 
magic keys to unlocking solutions to the complex problems societies face. The no 
general structure thesis applies generally across scales at which we experience the world. 
It has implications for how philosophers should understand scientific knowledge and 
for how scientists construct such knowledge. And it can inform the public 
understanding, support, and use of science. Such a thesis counts as significant 
metaphysics.  
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